Tagged: tempest

HackRF and Portapack Featured in Recent Linus Tech Tips Video

Over on YouTube the Linus Tech Tips channel has recently released a video about the HackRF titled "It’s TOO Easy to Accidentally Do Illegal Stuff with This". Linus Tech Tips is an extremely popular computer technology YouTube channel. The HackRF is a popular transmit capable software defined radio that was released about 10 years ago. The portapack is an add-on for the HackRF that allows the HackRF to be used as a handheld device, and when combined with the Mayhem firmware, it enables easy access to some controversial tools that could get a user into a lot of legal trouble very fast.

In the video Linus, whose team is based in Canada, mentions that they decided to purchase the HackRF and similar devices because of the Canadian government's plan to ban various RF tools, including the Flipper Zero and HackRF.

Linus then discusses and demonstrates "van eck phreaking" with TempestSDR, showing how he can use the HackRF to recover the video from a PC monitor wirelessly. He then goes on to demonstrate how the Portapack can be used to jam a wireless GoPro camera transmitting over WiFi. 

Finally, Linus discusses the legality and morality of such devices being available on the market.

It’s TOO Easy to Accidentally Do Illegal Stuff with This

Deep-Tempest: Eavesdropping on HDMI via SDR and Deep Learning

Over the years we've posted several times about the TEMPEST applications of software-defined radio. TEMPEST aka (Van Eck Phreaking) is when you listen to the unintentional RF emissions of electronics and are able to recover information from that. In the past, we posted about TempestSDR, an RTL-SDR compatible program that allows you to view images from a computer monitor or TV simply by picking up the unintentional RF emissions from it.

Usually, the images received are fuzzy and it can be difficult to recover any information from them. However recently there has been work on combining Tempest techniques with deep learning AI for improving image quality.

Deep-tempest has recently been released on GitHub and from their demonstrations, the ability to recover the true image with deep learning is very impressive. From a fuzzy grey screen, they show how they were able to recover clear text which looks almost exactly like the original monitor image.

Deep-tempest is based on gr-tempest, and requires GNU Radio, Python 3.10 and a Conda environment. Instructions for installing it are on the GitHub.

The whitepaper on the University research done to implement Deep-Tempest can be found freely on arxiv at https://arxiv.org/pdf/2407.09717.

How Deep-Tempest Works
How Deep-Tempest Works
Deep-Tempest Results
Deep-Tempest Results

Snooping Network Traffic from LAN Cables with an RTL-SDR or HackRF

Mordechai Guri is a cyber-security security researcher at Israel's Ben Gurion University of the Negev. Recently Guri has described a method for sniffing network data from LAN Ethernet cables over an air gap through the use of RTL-SDR or HackRF software defined radios. Guri's paper is available directly here.

The idea behind the attack is that ethernet cables can act as an antenna, leaking signals at frequencies which can easily be sniffed by a SDR. The specific technique in the paper does not decode normal network traffic, instead it requires that malicious code which modulates a custom signal over the ethernet cable be installed on the PC first. The technique used appears to be similar to what the Etherify software by SQ5BPF uses, which modulates data in morse code by turning the network card on and off.

Receiving a signal modulated by the LanTenna malware

SDR Videos from DEFCON 29

Recently some videos from this years (mostly virtual) DEFCON 29 conference have been uploaded to YouTube. Defcon is a major yearly conference all about information security, and some of the talks deal with wireless and SDR topics. Some interesting talks that we've found from the main Defcon and Villages are posted below.

You can view all the talks directly as well as the many others via the main stage DEFCON YouTube channel, the ICS Village Channel, RF Village Channel and the Aerospace Village. There are also several talks from the Ham Radio Village recorded on Twitch. Did we miss any interesting talks? Please let us know in the comments.

Smart Meters: I'm Hacking Infrastructure and So Should You (Hash Salehi)

Why Smart Meters? This is a question Hash is often asked. There's no bitcoin or credit card numbers hiding inside, so he must want to steal power, right? Openly analyzing the technology running our critical infrastructure and publishing the findings is something Hash is passionate about. In the wake of the great Texas freeze of 2021, we can no longer "hope" those in power will make decisions that are in the people's best interest. This talk will present research on the Landis+Gyr GridStream series of smart meters used by Oncor, the largest energy provider in Texas.

Cyber attacks on Industrial Control Systems (ICS) differ in scope and impact based on a number of factors, including the adversary's intent, sophistication and capabilities, and familiarity with ICS and automated indutrial processes. In order to understand, identify and address the specific points that can prevent or stop an attack, a systematic model known as "Cyber Kill Chain" is detailed, a term that comes from the military environment and registered by the Lockheed Martin company. While most are familiar with terms and theoretical diagrams of how security should be implemented, in this talk we want to present live how an attack chain occurs from scratch to compromise industrial devices, the full kill chain, based in our experiences. The goal is to land these threats into the real world without the need to carry out these attacks with a nation-state budget.

Smart Meters: I'm Hacking Infrastructure and So Should You (Hash Salehi)

DEF CON 29 - Paz Hameiri - TEMPEST Radio Station

TEMPEST is a cyber security term that refers to the use of electromagnetic energy emissions generated by electronic devices to leak data out of a target device. The attacks may be passive (where the attacker receives the emissions and recovers the data) or active (where the attacker uses dedicated malware to target and emit specific data).

In this talk I present a new side channel attack that uses GPU memory transfers to emit electromagnetic waves which are then received and processed by the attacker. Software developed for this work encodes audio on one computer and transmits it to the reception equipment positioned fifty feet away. The signals are received and processed and the audio is decoded and played. The maximum bit rate achieved was 33kbit/s and more than 99% of the packets were received.

Frequency selection not only enables maximization of signal quality over distance, but also enables the attacker to receive signals from a specific computer when several computers in the area are active. The software developed demonstrates audio packets transfers, but other types of digital data may be transmitted using the same technique.

[Slides Link] [Whitepaper]

DEF CON 29 - Paz Hameiri - TEMPEST Radio Station

DEF CON 29 RF Village - cemaxecuter - RF Propagation and Visualization with DragonOS

"Today's presentation will start with a brief history of DragonOS, where it started and where it's at today. After a short introduction, I'll dive into the subject of visualizing RF propagation with DragonOS. I'll be showing a fresh OS install and the necessary steps to generate a rough estimate of a transmitter based on SRTM-3 elevation data, as well as a new feature enabling visualization/calculations of the path between transmitter and receiver .

Topics and hands on (pre-recorded) demonstrations will include the following,

  • SPLAT! is an RF Signal Propagation, Loss, And Terrain analysis tool for the electromagnetic spectrum between 20 MHz and 20 GHz.
  • Signal Server Multi-threaded RF coverage calculator
  • Dr. Bill Walker's role
  • Signal Server and DragonOS integration
  • DF-Aggregator Developer / Modifications for visualization

I’ll conclude talking about future improvements to RF propagation and visualization tools."

DEF CON 29 RF Village - cemaxecuter - RF Propagation and Visualization with DragonOS

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Receiving Unintentionally Radiated Signals from the Computer System Bus with an RTL-SDR

Back in 2018 we first posted about "System Bus Radio" which is code and a web based app that allows you to transmit RF directly from your computer without any transmitting hardware. It works on the principle of manipulating the unintentional RF radiation produced by a computers system bus by sending instructions that can produce different AM tones. The idea is to demonstrate how unintentional radiation from computers could be a security risk. 

Recently the creator of System Bus Radio has uploaded a guide on receiving the generated signals with an RTL-SDR. He recommends using an RTL-SDR with upconverter, balun and an AM loop antenna. He then shows how he was able to receive the signals from his  MacBook Pro M1, noting that he was able to receive audible signals from several inches away at frequencies between 63 kHz to 5.5 MHz.

System Bus Radio received with an RTL-SDR and upconverter.

Etherify Talk from The rC3 Online Conference

The "Chaos Computer Club (CCC)" have recently been uploading videos to YouTube from their "Remote Chaos Experience rC3" online conference. One talk is by Jacek Lipkowski (SQ5BPF) who presents his Etherify project which we have posted about a few times on this blog already. Etherify is a program that allows users to exploit unintentional RF leakage from Ethernet hardware in order to transmit data over the air, essentially creating a primitive software defined radio. In particular the Raspberry Pi 4 was found to have extreme unintentional leakage, with the signal being receivable from over 50m away.

Primitive soft tempest demos: exfiltrating data via leakage from ethernet and more :)

In this talk i will describe shortly the concept of soft tempest, and show a demo of etherify and sonify. Etherify uses radio frequency leakage from ethernet to exfiltrate data. Sonify uses ultrasound.
Both demos by design use very primitive tools and hardware, and are easy to replicate.

#rC3 Etherify - bringing the ether back to ethernet

Etherify 4: Using PC Ethernet RF Leakage to Transmit QRSS CW

Recently we've posted about Etherify a few times, mostly about how the unintentional RF leakage from the Raspberry Pi 4 Ethernet hardware is really strong and can be modulated to transmit data. In one of his latest posts Jacek Lipkowski (SQ5BPF) explores if Ethernet ports on PC's exhibit any sort of RF leakage too, and if it can be modulated into a data signal.

The answer is yes, there is some RF leakage, however unlike the Pi 4 the speed at which the leakage can be modulated is much slower, and also the signal strength is much lower. Despite the slow modulation speed, Jacek was still able to transmit data by using QRSS CW, which is essentially just very slow morse code. Using this idea he was able to transmit, and receive the CW signal with an RTL-SDR over a distance of 3 meters at 375 MHz, 625 MHz and 250 MHz. The signal strength is nothing like the Pi 4's Ethernet RF leakage which can be received strongly from over 50 meters away however.

Etherify: Transmitting QRSS CW via Ethernet RF leakage from PC to PC

Etherify: Pi 4 Exhibits Very Strong Ethernet RF Leakage

Not too long ago we posted about Jacek Lipkowski (SQ5BPF)'s project called "Etherify" which seeks to use unintentional RF radiation from Ethernet hardware/cables to transmit arbitrary signals such as morse code and FSK. During his earlier experiments he noted how he felt that the Raspberry Pi 4 had an unusually strong radiated Ethernet signal. In his recent post Jacek investigates this further.

Indeed his new tests seem to confirm that the Pi 4 has excessive RF leakage from the Ethernet hardware. His latest results have shown that he was able to receive the Ethernet leakage strongly from 50 meters away without any cable connected to the Ethernet port to act as a radiator. Jacek's post contains a number of demonstration videos such as the one below.

He admits that his particular Pi 4 unit might be unique in this regard. If anyone else tests this and can confirm excessive leakage, please let us know in the comments.

Ethernet RF leakage received strongly from 50m away without any antenna on the Pi 4