In April, a stock research firm told clients that a Gulfstream V owned by Houston-based Occidental Petroleum Corp. had been spotted at an Omaha airport. The immediate speculation was that Occidental executives were negotiating with Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway Inc. to get financial help in their $38 billion offer for rival Anadarko Petroleum Corp. Two days later, Buffett announced a $10 billion investment in Occidental.
There’s some evidence that aircraft-tracking can be used to get an early read on corporate news. A 2018 paper from security researchers at the University of Oxford and Switzerland’s federal Science and Technology department, tracked aircraft from three dozen public companies and identified seven instances of mergers-and-acquisitions activity. “It probably shouldn’t be your prime source of investing information, but as a feeder, as an alert of something else what might be going on, that’s where this work might be useful,” says Matthew Smith, a researcher at Oxford’s computer science department and one of the authors.
"Alternative data" collection firms like Quandl Inc. have services like "corporate aviation intelligence", where they use ADS-B data to keep tabs on private aircraft, then sell their data on to hedge funds and other investors who are hoping to gain an edge in the stock market.
Popular flight tracking sites that aggregate ADS-B data like FlightAware and FlightRadar24 censor data from private jets on their public maps upon the request of the owner, but it's not known if they continue to sell private jet data on to other parties. ADS-B Exchange is one ADS-B aggregator that promises to never censor flights, however the data is only free for non-commercial use. The value from using companies like Quandl is that they probably have a much more accurate database of who each private jet belongs to.
The Regulus researchers noted that the Tesla is highly dependent on GNSS reliability, and thus were able to use an SDR to spoof GNSS signals causing the Model 3 to perform dangerous maneuvers like "extreme deceleration and acceleration, rapid lane changing suggestions, unnecessary signaling, multiple attempts to exit the highway at incorrect locations and extreme driving instability". Regarding exiting at the wrong location they write:
Although the car was a few miles away from the planned exit when the spoofing attack began, the car reacted as if the exit was just 500 feet away— slowing down from 60 MPH to 24 KPH, activating the right turn signal, and making a right turn off the main road into the emergency pit stop. During the sudden turn the driver was with his hands on his lap since he was not prepared for this turn to happen so fast and by the time he grabbed the wheel and regained manual control, it was too late to attempt to maneuver back to the highway safely.
In addition, they also tested spoofing on a Model S and found there to be a link between the car's navigation system and the automatically adjustable air suspension system. It appears that the Tesla adjusts it's suspension depending on the type of road it's on which is recorded in it's map database.
In their work they used a ADALM PLUTO SDR ($150) for their jamming tests, and a bladeRF SDR ($400) for their spoofing tests. Their photos also show a HackRF.
Regulus are also advertising that they are hosting a Webinar on July 11, 2019 at 09:00PM Jerusalen time. During the webinar they plan to talk about their Tesla 3 spoofing work and release previously unseen footage.
Back at the 2018 Black Hat conference it was revealed by security researchers Billy Rios and Jonathan Butts that a HackRF could be used to take control of a Medtronic insulin pump. Back then FDA advisories were issued, but recently a new warning noting that Medtronic MiniMed 508 and Paradigm series insulin pumps could be vulnerable to wireless attacks was again issued. The vulnerabilities could allow hackers to wireless cause the device to deliver excessive amounts of insulin or stop insulin delivery.
Apparently the vulnerabilities cannot be fixed with a software update, so Medtronic have issued a voluntary recall, asking customers to contact their healthcare providers so that they can upgrade to their newer units which are more secure (although these newer units are not available everywhere outside the USA). We also note that Medtronic implantable cardiac defibrillators (ICDs) which appear to share the same vulnerability do not appear to have been recalled. For both the insulin pumps and ICDs, the issues stem from the fact that the "Conexus" wireless protocol used in the products do not use encryption, authentication or authorization.
Security researchers Billy Rios, Jonathan Butts, and Jesse Young found that the wireless radio communications used between a vulnerable MiniMed pump uses and its CareLink controller device was insecure. An attacker who was in close enough physical proximity to the pump could masquerade as a CareLink unit, and send potentially life-threatening commands to the insulin pump over the air using a software-defined radio or similar kit.
"The vulnerabilities affect the radio features," Rios told The Register. "They use a custom radio protocol and the vulnerabilities were exploited through the use of software-defined radios."
Previously we also posted about how an RTL-SDR could be used to sniff RF data packets from a Minimed Insulin pump using the rtlmm software, and back in 2016 we posted how data could be sniffed from an implanted defibrillator.
This weeks episode of Hak5 (an information security themed YouTube channel) features Dale Wooden (@TB69RR) who joins hosts Shannon and Darren to demonstrate a zero day vulnerability against Ford keyless entry/ignition. More details about the vulnerability will be presented at this years DEF CON 27 conference, which is due to be held on August 8 - 11.
In the video Dale first demonstrates how he uses a HackRF with Portapack to capture and then replay the signal from a Ford vehicle's keyfob. The result is that the original keyfob no longer functions, locking the owner out from the car. After performing a second process with another keyfob, Dale is now able to fully replicate a keyfob, and unlock the car from his HackRF.
Dale explains that unlike the well known jam-and-replay methods, his requires no jamming, and instead uses a vulnerability to trick the car into resetting the rolling code counter back to zero, allowing him to capture rolling codes that are always valid. Dale also notes that he could use any RX capable SDR like an RTL-SDR to automatically capture signals from over 100m away.
The vulnerability has been disclosed to Ford, and the full details and code to do the attack will only be released at DEF CON 27, giving Ford enough time to fix the vulnerability. It is known to affect 2019 Ford F-150 Raptors, Mustangs and 2017 Ford Expeditions, but other models are also likely to be vulnerable.
The video is split into three parts. In part 1 Dale demonstrates the vulnerability on a real vehicle and in part 2 he explains the story behind his discovery, how he responsibly disclosed the vulnerability to Ford and how to reset the keyfob yourself. Finally in part 3 Darren interviews Dale about his experiences in the RF security field.
Modern cell phones in the USA are all required to support the Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) program, which allows citizens to receive urgent messages like AMBER (child abduction) alerts, severe weather warnings and Presidential Alerts.
In January 2018 an incoming missile alert was accidentally issued to residents in Hawaii, resulting in panic and disruption. More recently an unblockable Presidential Alert test message was sent to all US phones. These events have prompted researchers at the University of Colorado Boulder to investigate concerns over how this alert system could be hacked, potentially allowing bad actors to cause mass panic on demand (SciHub Paper).
Their research showed that four low cost USRP or bladeRF TX capable software defined radios (SDR) with 1 watt output power each, combined with open source LTE base station software could be used to send a fake Presidential Alert to a stadium of 50,000 people (note that this was only simulated - real world tests were performed responsibly in a controlled environment). The attack works by creating a fake and malicious LTE cell tower on the SDR that nearby cell phones connect to. Once connected an alert can easily be crafted and sent to all connected phones. There is no way to verify that an alert is legitimate.
In order to create a second transmitter he decided to reverse engineer the doorbells wireless signal, and use that information to create an Arduino based transmitter. His process involves first using an RTL-SDR to determine the transmission frequency, then using the rtl_433 software to capture the raw waveform which he then analyzes manually using Audacity. Once the binary string, length and pulse width is known he is able to program an Arduino connected to a 433 MHz transmitter to replicate the signal.
In future posts Shreyas hopes to explore other ways to transmit the signal, and eventually design a simple but configurable 433 MHz push button that supports RF, WiFi, and can support the IFTTT web service.
If you're interested, check out some of our previous posts that highlight many other successful reverse engineering experiments with RF devices and SDR.
Corrosive from the SignalsEverywhere YouTube channel has released a new episode of his podcast. In this episode Corrosive interviews an anonymous informant who has an interesting story about his involvement with the UHF Military SATCOM pirate radio scene in Brazil. Corrosive also explains a bit further about what SATCOM is and why it's so susceptible to piracy. He also notes that piracy on Inmarsat L-band frequencies is also becoming more common.
The UHF-SATCOM band is anywhere between 243 - 270 MHz and contains fairly strong signals from many several US satellites that can be received with a simple antenna and any UHF radio/SDR. Many of the satellites are simple repeaters without security, and pirates from Mexico and South America often hijack the satellite for their own personal use. In the past, and possibly even still today hijackers involved in drug trafficking and other illegal activities made use of these insecure military satellites for long range communications. Reception of these satellites is generally available in Canada, US, Mexico, South America, Europe and Africa.
Satcom Crackdown; Satellite Piracy on After The Show Podcast
Circle City Con is a yearly conference that focuses on information security talks. At this years conference Josh Conway presented an interesting talk titled "SigInt for the Masses Building and Using a Signals Intelligence Platform for Less than $150". Josh's talk introduces his "RadioInstigator" hardware which is a combination of a Raspberry Pi, CrazyRadio and an RTL-SDR all packaged into a 3D printed enclosure with LCD screen. The idea behind the RadioInstigator is to create a portable and low cost Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) device that can be used to investigate and manipulate the security of radio signals.
The RadioInstigator makes use of the RPiTX software which allows a Raspberry Pi to transmit an arbitrary radio signal from 5 kHz up to 1500 MHz without the use of any additional transmitting hardware - just connect an antenna directly to a GPIO pin. Connected to the Pi is a CrazyRadio, which is a nRF24LU1+ based radio that can be used to receive and transmit 2.4 GHz. And of course there is an RTL-SDR for receiving every other signal. Josh has made the plans for the RadioInstigator fully open source over on GitLab.
In his talk Josh introduces the RadioInstigator, then goes on to discuss other SDR hardware, antenna concepts and software installed on the RadioInstrigator like RPiTX, GNU Radio, Universal Radio Hacker, Salamandra, TempestSDR and more.