Category: Security

August 18, 2026

KrakenSDR Tested as a GNSS Jammer and Spoofer Localizer

KrakenSDR is our 5-channel coherent software-defined radio designed for applications such as radio direction finding. It was successfully crowdfunded on Crowdsupply back in 2021. We've recently come across a 2025 paper in the Journal of the Institute of Navigation, describing how KrakenSDR was successfully tested as a real-world GNSS jammer and spoofer localizer.

Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) services such as GPS are easily jammed by hostile terrestrial signals due to their low transmit power. Jamming is commonly used in modern conflict environments, and is seen heavily in use around Ukraine, Russia, and the Middle East. Similarly, spoofing, which is transmitting a fake GNSS signal to trick receivers into seeing fake locations, is also in use.

In their paper, Lasse Lehmann et al. from the Technical University of Denmark demonstrate the use of a KrakenSDR for detecting GPS L1 jammers at 1575.42 MHz. The tests were performed at Jammertest 2023, an annual event for open GNSS experiments, and they were able to locate a spoofer down to 18.1 meters via a vehicle-mounted KrakenSDR .

August 18, 2026

Carshepherd: An Android RTL-SDR App For the Early Awareness of Nearby Emergency-Service Vehicles

Thank you to Cees for writing in and sharing his Android app, "Carshepherd," which is currently in the pre-release stage. Carshepherd works with a connected RTL-SDR and TETRA antenna to give drivers early awareness of nearby emergency-service activity (such as police, ambulance, fire) by detecting the TETRA uplink signal.

Cees notes that this is essentially the same as what hardware devices like 'Target Blu Eye' do to detect emergency services. Laser/radar detectors are illegal in most European countries, and while not advertised as such for legal reasons, Carshepherd could be a legal alternative for detecting laser/radar speed traps, detecting ProViDa video-based pacing vehicles, or just for general awareness.

The app works by continuously sweeping the TETRA bands, looking for the signature of a TETRA carrier. Once it detects a confirmed uplink carrier, it estimates proximity, which then triggers a readout and audible alert. The TETRA uplink is not always active, but emergency service vehicles often send bursts of uplink data every few seconds with GPS position updates, and, of course, during voice PTT.

The algorithm is based on a large labeled dataset from dozens of real-world test drives. The dataset trains an AI classifier that can even tell you whether an emergency unit is keeping pace with you (e.g., traveling down the same stretch of motorway as you) or whether you are approaching a stationary unit.

Carshepherd currently only works in countries whose emergency services use the TETRA communications protocol, which includes most of Europe and various other countries, but notably not the USA. However, Cees notes that they are working on a US version that will listen to the P25 network.

While Carshepherd has not yet been released, the pricing is indicated as €3.99 per month. You can sign up for the waitlist at www.carshepherd.nl.

August 11, 2026

ESP32 Bit Pirate Updates: New LoRa and Meshtastic Analysis Features

Back in September 2025, we posted about the "ESP32 Bus Pirate" firmware, which transforms an ESP32-S3 into a multi-protocol debugging and hacking tool. We later covered an update in March 2026 that added waterfall displays, cellular modem support, and an external radio expander.

Although the ESP32 does not have true SDR capabilities, it can leverage its numerous built-in radio hardware components to achieve a range of interesting SDR-like features. Recently, "Geo," the creator of the ESP32 Bus Pirate, wrote in to share some recent firmware updates with us.

Geo notes that the project is now called "ESP32 Bit Pirate" and now includes LoRa/SX1262 support and Meshtastic analysis features.

ESP32 Bit Pirate can now transmit and receive LoRa packets, monitor RSSI, scan frequency activity, display a simple waterfall view and perform Channel Activity Detection. Radio parameters including frequency, bandwidth, spreading factor, coding rate, transmit power, preamble and sync word can be configured directly from the interface.

Packets can also be recorded to the ESP32 filesystem and replayed later together with their original radio configuration.

A dedicated Meshtastic analysis shell has also been added, allowing users to send, receive and inspect Meshtastic packets. The goal is not to replace a Meshtastic node, but to provide a debugging and experimentation interface for understanding and interacting with LoRa/Meshtastic traffic.

The latest update has also added new LoRa hardware support for the Heltec Vision Master T190 and Heltec WiFi LoRa 32 V4, a browser-based debugging ecosystem, a Python scripting lab, and a BPIO2 USB adapter mode.

The project is entirely open source, and the code can be found on their GitHub page.

August 7, 2026

FrameRF: An SDR-Based Technical Surveillance Counter-Measure Analysis Platform

Thank you to Stefano Cangiano, an Italian TSCM (Technical Surveillance Counter-Measures) specialist, for writing in and sharing with us about the release of his FrameRF product. Stefano writes:

After more than ten years of operational field experience, I developed FrameRF, a professional SDR-based TSCM analysis platform designed to help operators rapidly identify, classify and prioritize RF signals in complex environments.

Rather than replacing existing SDR software, FrameRF focuses on operational analysis by correlating multiple wireless technologies (Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, BLE, GSM, LTE and others) into a single workflow that supports real-world investigations.

FrameRF has been developed from real operational TSCM field experience, with the goal of reducing RF analysis time and helping operators make faster and more informed decisions during technical inspections.

To summarize, FrameRF appears to be a portable deployable kit, consisting of a laptop, SDR hardware, antennas, and custom software in a rugged briefcase. The product is intended to be used by TSCM specialists for applications like sweeping for RF bugs, corporate security audits, and finding anomalous signals.

It can do things like detect LTE voice activity, automatically classify signals, alert the user based on patterns, detect a DECT phone call, recognize Apple AirTags, estimate if different random Bluetooth MAC addresses belong to the same physical device, analyze the WiFi environment, reconstruct device relationships, and detect hidden WiFi networks and potential spoofing.

If you are interested, Stefano has provided a PDF brochure explaining the product further.

FrameRF – Professional RF Behavioral Analysis Platform | TSCM Video Demonstration

Watch this video on YouTube

July 20, 2026

TrojPix: Covertly Transmitting Data from Air-Gapped Systems via Video Cable Emissions

Researchers from the University of Shandong have recently demonstrated in a paper that they can transmit data from an air-gapped PC by using a Trojan to implement imperceptible pixel modulation in a monitor.

Every electronic device unintentionally emits RF, and PC monitors, TVs, and screens are no exception. In the past, we have shown that with simple TEMPEST tools, it is easy to recover the image on a screen over a distance using an RTL-SDR or Airspy SDR.

TrojPix relies on the unintentional emitted RF from a PC monitor's video cable. By subtly modulating the pixels on a screen, it is possible to enable data transfer via the unintentional emissions. This means that any PC infected with the TrojPix Trojan could transfer data wirelessly to a snooper, even if the PC is totally disconnected from any wired or wireless network. The only way to stop such an attack would be to completely shield the PC with a faraday cage.

The team note that they were able to achieve a peak data throughput of 8.1 MBps over a max range of 208 meters. They tested nine commercially available monitors and fifteen digital video cables, each demonstrating significant usable RF leakage.

The receiver hardware used was a USRP X310 software-defined radio sampling at 10 MHz and the transmissions appear to have been at 148.5 MHz and 297 MHz.

TrojPix Experiment: Receiving Data over 210 neters,.

July 20, 2026

War Driving for DECT Devices with a HackRF and Android Device

Over on her YouTube channel SignalsEverywhere, Sarah has uploaded an interesting video showing her doing a wardrive for DECT devices, with an Android device connected to a HackRF, running her own Android version of DECT toolkit. In the past, we also covered her DeDECTive software, which is a fully DECT scanner and voice decoder for Linux and the HackRF.

DECT is a digital wireless protocol operating at around 1.9 GHz, which is typically used by modern cordless home phones, baby monitors, headsets, intercoms, and more. If you are unfamiliar with the term wardriving, this is when someone drives around in a vehicle and looks for interesting signals around the area. Wardriving is typically associated with mapping out the local WiFi environment and looking for security flaws, but it can apply to any signal.

During her wardrive, Sarah finds mostly VTech cordless phones, but a few other models like 'Binatone' and 'RTX' pop up, which she suspects are headsets, one possibly from a local McDonald's. She notes that only one active call was found, although the video has voice decoding stripped out for privacy reasons. She also notes that no encryption was found to be enabled on any device, despite DECT supporting it. The Android App also records the GPS position of any found DECT devices on a map.

War Driving for DECT Devices

Watch this video on YouTube

May 5, 2026

Student Arrested in Taiwan for using SDR and Handheld Radios to Halt Four High Speed Trains with TETRA Hack

The Taipei Times has reported that a 23-year-old university student in Taiwan has been arrested after using a software-defined radio and hand held radio to hack into Taiwan High Speed Rail Corporation's (THSRC) internal radio communications and halt four trains mid-service.

Chinese-language coverage from UDN and Newtalk fills in some details omitted in the English Taipei Times article. The system the student compromised is TETRA, and at 23:23 on April 5, 2026, the student transmitted a "General Alarm" (GA) signal, the highest-priority TETRA alert, which automatically instructs trains in the area to switch to manual emergency braking. Four trains were stopped for 48 minutes. THSRC's radio system has reportedly been in service for 19 years with seven verification layers, but parameters were apparently never meaningfully rotated over that period.

Police describe the suspect as buying an SDR online, connecting it between an antenna and a laptop, capturing THSRC traffic, and decoding the relevant parameters in software, then programming those parameters into one of his eleven handheld radios. A 21-year-old friend also allegedly supplied some critical THSRC parameters. The actual details of the 'hack' aren't entirely clear from the news articles. We suspect that the THSRC TETRA system is simply unencrypted, and that the student was able to spoof a legitimate signal. It's also possible that the THSRC TETRA system used TEA1 encryption, which is known to be broken.

Police located the student through a combination of network-side TETRA logs and CCTV. When the THSRC control center called back to verify the alarm, the person on the other end gave contradictory answers and then powered the radio off, prompting THSRC to audit their handheld fleet, confirm every issued radio was accounted for in its storage locker, and report to police that the parameters had been cloned.

Base station logs from the THSRC TETRA infrastructure (which record which sites received the uplink, with multi-site signal strength narrowing the origin) were used to localize the transmission source, and CCTV from around the coverage area was then used to identify the student and trace him to his rental unit. Search warrants on 28 April seized 11 handheld radios, a laptop, and the SDR.

He is currently out on NT$100,000 (3,200 USD) bail and faces up to ten years under Taiwan's Railway Act and Criminal Code, with an unconvincing "had it in my pocket and accidentally pressed the button" defense.

Stories like this are a reminder that experimenting with operational safety-of-life radio systems carries serious legal consequences. Back in 2016, we covered the case of Dejan Ornig, a Slovenian university student who used an RTL-SDR and the open source Osmocom TETRA decoder to discover that his country's police TETRA terminals were running unauthenticated, despite official documents stating otherwise. After seven years of court hearings, he ended up with a seven-month suspended sentence. More recently, we posted on the End of Train (EoT) vulnerability, where a security researcher demonstrated that an SDR can replicate the unauthenticated braking command on US freight trains.

A Taiwanese High Speed Train (Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:THSR_700T_TR17_20130907.jpg)

Translated news graphic from https://udn.com/news/story/7315/9475450

April 28, 2026

Detecting Hidden GPS Trackers via Electromagnetic Unintentional Emissions with a HackRF

Researchers from Hunan University, Boise State, and UT Arlington have published a paper called "GPSBuster" (PDF link), demonstrating how a HackRF One can sniff out covert GPS trackers by their unintended electromagnetic radiation. Hidden trackers are hard to find since they only receive satellite signals and may store coordinates locally rather than transmit. Instead of looking for transmissions, GPSBuster targets side-channel leakage from the tracker's mixed-signal SoC, specifically the coupling between the quartz oscillator, local oscillator, and mixer used to downconvert the 1575.42 MHz L1 signal.

The team found that an active tracker leaks two characteristic spectra: a low band around 26 to 104 MHz and a high band around 1545 to 1625 MHz, each with a strong peak and evenly spaced harmonics. The low band reflects coupling between the quartz oscillator (typically 26 MHz) and the IF, while the high band contains LO plus IF spacing that always sums to 1575.42 MHz, giving a database-free detection rule. The setup consists of a HackRF, an NFP-3 near-field probe, and a 35 dB LNA. The use of the near-field probe means that sweeping the probe over an area to find the tracker is necessary, and the maximum detection range was 0.61 m.

Tested against the top 10 trackers available on a popular online marketplace, GPSBuster hit a 98.4% detection rate, working through plastic, cotton, canvas, and leather, and alongside phones, laptops, and speakers. It also extended to L1+L5 modules like the Quectel LC29H series, and even metal-shielded chips still leaked enough via PCB traces to be picked up.