In the last post from a couple of days ago we posted about RECESSIM's YouTube series about smart meter hacking. Hackaday have noted that Hash, the security researcher behind the RECESSIM channel will be hosting a Hack Chat on April 14 noon pacific time. If you're unfamiliar with them, hack chats are live chat events where you can chat directly with an expert on a particular topic.
That electrical meter on the side of your house might not look like it, but it's pretty packed with technology. What was once a simple electromechanical device that a human would have to read in person is now a node on a far-flung network. Not only does your meter tote up the amount of electricity you use, but it also talks to other meters in the neighborhood, sending data skipping across town to routers that you might never have noticed as it makes its way back to the utility. And the smartest of smart meters not only know how much electricity you're using, but they can also tease information about which appliances are being used simply by monitoring patterns of usage.
While all this sounds great for utility companies, what does it mean for the customers? What are the implications of having a network of smart meters all talking to each other wirelessly? Are these devices vulnerable to attack? Have they been engineered to be as difficult to exploit as something should be when it's designed to be in service for 15 years or more?
These questions and more burn within Hash, a hardware hacker and security researcher who runs the RECESSIM reverse-engineering wiki. He's been inside a smart meter or two and has shared a lot of what he has learned on the wiki and with some in-depth Smart Meter Hacking videos. He'll stop by the Hack Chat to discuss what he's learned about the internals of smart meters, how they work, and where they may be vulnerable to attack.
Over on YouTube channel RECESSIM has uploaded a three part series on reverse engineering smart utility meters. In many locations wireless mesh smart electricity meters are installed in houses allowing for completely wireless monitoring. These mesh network devices pass the wireless data from meter to meter until the data reaches a router that is typically placed on a neighborhood power pole.
In the first video Recessim explains how a smart meter mesh network works, and demonstrates signal reception in the 900 MHz band with a USRP B200 software defined radio.
In the second video he demonstrates how he can see meter ID and power outage information from Oncor meters, explains his GNU Radio flowgraph setup and goes on to explain how he reverse engineered the data packets.
Finally in the third video he performs a few teardowns of smart meters he found on eBay, and shows his reverse engineering setup with a faraday cage. More videos are likely to be on the way, so you might want to consider subscribing to his channel for updates. Recessim is also diligently recording all the information he's discovered about the meters on his Wiki.
Over on YouTube channel Privacy & Tech Tips has uploaded a video showing how he used an RTL-SDR to pick up RF emissions coming from some speakers that were unintentionally acting as wireless microphones. He goes on to show how you can clean up the noisy received audio in Audacity using the noise reduction filter.
I show how electromagnetic emissions from personal devices many times turn our devices into (potential) remote listening + transmitting devices when active (as demonstrated). I discovered my speakers unintentionally transmitting audio (speaker acting as microphone) to a few different frequencies via GQRX recording (computer/Pinetab microphones completely disabled).
There are a few frequencies you can tune into to listen in remotely. This includes listening in to conversations in the room as the speaker also acts as a microphone when playing sound (***tested only on my own devices***).
When the speaker volume is turned down, the signal goes down and the broadcast goes away. When the speaker volume is down, it no longer functions as a remote microphone + transmitter.
We use Audacity to clean up the audio. GQRX is used to record the signals which are filtered on the Pinetab with internal RTL-SDR. Audio processing/noise reduction done running Parrot Linux using Audacity.
We touch on the fact all electronic devices give off their very own unique electromagnetic emissions which can act as device signatures (strength depends on shielding).
Sometimes speaker wire not properly shielded (as is found in most PC's) can act as a radio transmitter antenna without user knowledge. Here I discovered a few frequencies broadcasting the audio live (.25 second delay for SDR modulation).
Demo: Speakers Become Unintentional Listening Device Broadcasting Mult Frequencies (GQRX/Pinetab)
Over on their blog Trend Micro have uploaded a post describing how they evaluated the security of LoRaWAN communications using an RTL-SDR. LoRaWAN is a wireless communications technology that allows for Internet of Things (IoT) connectivity at a much lower cost compared to cellular infrastructure. However, as described in their post LoRaWAN incorporates very little security, making connected devices an easy target for hackers.
The researchers at Trend Micro used an RTL-SDR together with the LoRaPWN software tool which is an improved version of the LoRa Craft Project. With LoRaPWN the researchers were able to intercept uplink and downlink packets. Then when combined with a brute force dictionary attack, they were then able to recover the encryption keys allowing them to decode the data. Finally they were also able to demonstrate a denial of service attack which results in a device being unable to send further data.
For more information the technical paper (pdf) describing their full setup and tests is available, as well as an older post describing possible LoRaWAN attacks. There is also a YouTube video from "The Things Conference" which we have embedded below. In the video researcher Sebastian Dudek presents some of his findings on LoRaWAN security.
LoRaPWNing: Practical radio attacks on LoRaWAN - Sebastian Dudek (Trend Micro)
The "Chaos Computer Club (CCC)" have recently been uploading videos to YouTube from their "Remote Chaos Experience rC3" online conference. One talk is by Jacek Lipkowski (SQ5BPF) who presents his Etherify project which we have posted about a few times on this blog already. Etherify is a program that allows users to exploit unintentional RF leakage from Ethernet hardware in order to transmit data over the air, essentially creating a primitive software defined radio. In particular the Raspberry Pi 4 was found to have extreme unintentional leakage, with the signal being receivable from over 50m away.
Primitive soft tempest demos: exfiltrating data via leakage from ethernet and more :)
In this talk i will describe shortly the concept of soft tempest, and show a demo of etherify and sonify. Etherify uses radio frequency leakage from ethernet to exfiltrate data. Sonify uses ultrasound. Both demos by design use very primitive tools and hardware, and are easy to replicate.
#rC3 Etherify - bringing the ether back to ethernet
Over on YouTube popular science content creator Steve Mould has uploaded a video showing how he was able to open his own car using a HackRF software defined radio. In the video Steve first uses the Universal Radio Hacker software to perform a simple replay attack by using his HackRF (and also an RTL-SDR V3) to record the car's keyfob signal away from the car and replay it near the car.
Steve goes on to note that most cars use rolling code security, so a simple replay attack like the above is impractical in most situations. Instead he notes how a more advanced technique called "rolljam" can be used, which we have posted about a few times in the past. Later in the video Steve interviews Samy Kamkar who was the security researcher who first popularized the rolljam technique at Defcon 2015.
The answer is yes, there is some RF leakage, however unlike the Pi 4 the speed at which the leakage can be modulated is much slower, and also the signal strength is much lower. Despite the slow modulation speed, Jacek was still able to transmit data by using QRSS CW, which is essentially just very slow morse code. Using this idea he was able to transmit, and receive the CW signal with an RTL-SDR over a distance of 3 meters at 375 MHz, 625 MHz and 250 MHz. The signal strength is nothing like the Pi 4's Ethernet RF leakage which can be received strongly from over 50 meters away however.
The Portapack is an add on for the popular HackRF SDR which allows the HackRF to be used portably without a PC. Recently the cost of this hardware duo has come down to below US$150 due to low cost Chinese clones now being available on the market. Generally the clones are of good quality too.
Once you have the hardware it is possible to install third party custom firmware such as "Mayhem" on the Portapack which enables many features such as the ability to receive and transmit various different types of RF protocols. Back in 2018 we did a review of Mayhems predecessor which was known as the "Havok" firmware. More recently Tech Minds did a video overview of Mayhem.
Now over on his blog A. Petazzoni has started a new blog series which aims to introduce the basics of the Mayhem firmware, including installation and some hands on testing with RF spoofing, denial-of-service (DoS) and replay attacks. Currently only his first post is out, and in the post he show how to install Mayhem onto the Portapack, then goes on to briefly overview some applications such as RF replay attacks, replicating wireless remote controls, receiving and transmitting POCSAG, receiving and transmitting ADS-B, and creating a jammer.
Obviously a lot of what you can do with a Portapack and the Mayhem firmware is extremely illegal and very dangerous, so please do be careful with what and where you transmit especially if you are new to RF hobby. These signals should remain in your test area only, and not leak out into the wider environment.