Category: Security

Upcoming Book “Inside Radio: An Attack and Defense Guide”

Unicorn team are information security researchers who often also dabble with wireless security research. Recently they have been promoting their upcoming text book titled "Inside Radio: An Attack and Defense Guide".

Judging from the blurb and released contents the book will be an excellent introduction to anyone interested in today's wireless security issues. They cover topics such as RFID, Bluetooh, ZigBee, GSM, LTE and GPS. In regards to SDRs, the book specifically covers SDRs like the RTL-SDR, HackRF, bladeRF and LimeSDR and their role in wireless security research. They also probably reference and show how to use those SDRs in the  chapters about replay attacks, ADS-B security risks, and GSM security.

The book is yet to be released and is currently available for pre-order on Amazon or Springer for US$59.99. The expected release date is May 9, 2018, and copies will also be for sale at the HITB SECCONF 2018 conference during 9 - 13 April in Amsterdam.

The blurb and released contents are pasted below. See their promo page for the full contents list:

This book discusses the security issues in a wide range of wireless devices and systems, such as RFID, Bluetooth, ZigBee, GSM, LTE, and GPS. It collects the findings of recent research by the UnicornTeam at 360 Technology, and reviews the state-of-the-art literature on wireless security. The book also offers detailed case studies and theoretical treatments – specifically it lists numerous laboratory procedures, results, plots, commands and screenshots from real-world experiments. It is a valuable reference guide for practitioners and researchers who want to learn more about the advanced research findings and use the off-the-shelf tools to explore the wireless world.

Authors:
Qing YANG is the founder of UnicornTeam & the head of the Radio Security Research Department at 360 Technology. He has vast experience in information security area. He has presented at Black Hat, DEFCON, CanSecWest, HITB, Ruxcon, POC, XCon, China ISC etc.

Lin HUANG is a senior wireless security researcher and SDR technology expert at 360 Technology. Her interests include security issues in wireless communication, especially cellular network security. She was a speaker at Black Hat, DEFCON, and HITB security conferences. She is 360 Technology’s 3GPP SA3 delegate.

This book is a joint effort by the entire UnicornTeam, including Qiren GU, Jun LI, Haoqi SHAN, Yingtao ZENG, and Wanqiao ZHANG etc.

 

Transmitting RF Music Directly From the System Bus on your PC

Recently we've come into knowledge of a program on GitHub called "System Bus Radio" which lets you transmit RF directly from your computer, laptop or phone without any transmitting hardware at all. It works on the principle of manipulating the unintentional RF radiation produced by a computers system bus by sending instructions that can produce different AM tones. An SDR like the RTL-SDR V3 or RTL-SDR with upconverter, or any portable AM radio that can tune down to 1580 kHz can be used to receive the tones. To run the software don't even need to download or compile anything, as there is now a web based app that you can instantly run which will play a simple song.

However, the RF emissions don't seem to occur on every PC, or are perhaps at another frequency. We tested a Windows desktop and Dell laptop and found that no were signals produced. A list of field reports indicates that it is mostly MacBook Pro and Air computers that produce the signal, with some transmitting signals strong enough to be received from a few centimeters to up to 2m away. This could obviously be a security risk if a sophisticated attacker was able to sniff these tones and recover data.

This program runs instructions on the computer that cause electromagnetic radiation. The emissions are of a broad frequency range. To be accepted by the radio, those frequencies must:

  • Be emitted by the computer processor and other subsystems
  • Escape the computer shielding
  • Pass through the air or other obstructions
  • Be accepted by the antenna
  • Be selected by the receiver

By trial and error, the above frequency was found to be ideal for that equipment. If somebody would like to send me a SDR that is capable of receiving 100 kHz and up then I could test other frequencies.

There is also an interesting related piece of software based on System Bus Radio called 'musicplayer', which takes a .wav file and allows you to transmit the modulated music directly via the system bus.

If you're interested in unintentionally emitted signals from PCs, have a look at this previous post showing how to recover images from the unintentional signals emitted by computer monitors. This is also similar to RPiTX which is a similar concept for Raspberry Pi's.

System Bus Radio web app
System Bus Radio web app

Reverse Engineering or Brute Forcing Wireless Powerplug Remote Controls with a HackRF One

Over on his blog "Foo-Manroot" has created a post where he shows us how he can control a wirelessly controlled powerplug with his HackRF. These power plugs can be used to turn electrically devices on or off remotely, and their wireless protocol is often simple On-Off Keying (OOK) with little to no security.

Foo-Manroot first explains how easily capture and replay a signal with the HackRF. If the signal is simple without any security like rolling codes then a simple replay attack like this will allow the HackRF to control the device quite easily. In the next section he goes on to explain how to actually analyze and synthesize the packets yourself using Python and GNU Radio. Finally he also shows that a brute force attack can be applied once you know how to synthesize the signal. Brute forcing runs over every possible packet combination in a short time and this can be pretty fast for simple protocols like those used in wireless remote controls. His post also includes all the GNU Radio files required so it is easy for someone to replicate his work easily.

If you are interested in controlling simple OOK devices like a wireless powerplug with replay attacks then we have a tutorial for doing this with a simple RTL-SDR and Raspberry Pi running RpiTX which might be useful for those who don't have a HackRF.

HackRF Controlling the Wireless Power Outlet by Brute Forcing Packets
HackRF Controlling the Wireless Power Outlet by Brute Forcing Packets

 

Reverse Engineering for a Secure Future: Talk by Samy Kamkar

During the Hackaday superconference held during November 2017, Samy Kamkar presented a talk on how he reverse engineers devices, and in particular passive entry and start systems in vehicles. In the talk he also explains what tools he uses which includes SDRs like the HackRF One and RTL-SDR dongle and explains the methodology that he takes when looking at how to reverse engineer any new device. Samy is most famous for writing the Samy MySpace computer worm and also popularizing the "RollJam" wireless car door vulnerability. The talk blurb reads:

In this talk Samy Kamkar shares the exciting details on researching closed systems & creating attack tools to (demonstrate) wirelessly unlocking and starting cars with low-cost tools, home made PCBs, RFID/RF/SDR & more. He describes how to investigate an unknown system, especially when dealing with chips with no public datasheets and undisclosed protocols. Learn how vehicles communicate with keyfobs (LF & UHF), and ultimately how a device would work that can automatically detect the makes/models of keyfobs nearby. Once the keyfobs have been detected, an attacker could choose a vehicle and the device can wirelessly unlock & start the ignition. Like Tinder, but for cars.

SDR and Radio Talks from the 34th Chaos Communication Congress: SatNOGs, Bug Detection, GSM with SDR, Open Source Satellites and WiFi Holography

Every year the Chaos Computer Club hold the Chaos Communication Congress (CCC) which is a conference that aims to discuss various topics related to technology and security. This year was the 34th conference ever held (34C3) and there were several interesting SDR and radio related talks which we post below. Further links and video downloads are available in the YouTube description.

SatNOGS: Crowd-sourced satellite operations

An overview of the SatNOGS project, a network of satellite ground station around the world, optimized for modularity, built from readily available and affordable tools and resources.

We love satellites! And there are thousands of them up there. SatNOGS provides a scalable and modular platform to communicate with them. Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites are our priority, and for a good reason. Hundreds of interesting projects worth of tracking and listening are happening in LEO and SatNOGS provides a robust platform for doing so. We support VHF and UHF bands for reception with our default configuration, which is easily extendable for transmission and other bands too.

We designed and created a global management interface to facilitate multiple ground station operations remotely. An observer is able to take advantage of the full network of SatNOGS ground stations around the world.

Spy vs. Spy: A Modern Study Of Microphone Bugs Operation And Detection

In 2015, artist Ai Weiwei was bugged in his home, presumably by government actors. This situation raised our awareness on the lack of research in our community about operating and detecting spying microphones. Our biggest concern was that most of the knowledge came from fictional movies. Therefore, we performed a deep study on the state-of-the-art of microphone bugs, their characteristics, features and pitfalls. It included real life experiments trying to bug ourselves and trying to detect the hidden mics. Given the lack of open detection tools, we developed a free software SDR-based program, called Salamandra, to detect and locate hidden microphones in a room. After more than 120 experiments we concluded that placing mics correctly and listening is not an easy task, but it has a huge payoff when it works. Also, most mics can be detected easily with the correct tools (with some exceptions on GSM mics). In our experiments the average time to locate the mics in a room was 15 minutes. Locating mics is the novel feature of Salamandra, which is released to the public with this work. We hope that our study raises awareness on the possibility of being bugged by a powerful actor and the countermeasure tools available for our protection.

Running GSM mobile phone on SDR

Since SDR (Software Defined Radio) becomes more popular and more available for everyone, there is a lot of projects based on this technology. Looking from the mobile telecommunications side, at the moment it's possible to run your own GSM or UMTS network using a transmit capable SDR device and free software like OsmoBTS or OpenBTS. There is also the srsLTE project, which provides open source implementation of LTE base station (eNodeB) and moreover the client side stack (srsUE) for SDR. Our talk is about the R&D process of porting the existing GSM mobile side stack (OsmocomBB) to the SDR based hardware, and about the results we have achieved.

There is a great open source mobile side GSM protocol stack implementation - OsmocomBB project. One could be used for different purposes, including education and research. The problem is that the SDR platforms were out of the hardware the project could work on. The primary supported hardware for now are old Calypso based phones (mostly Motorola C1XX).

Despite they are designed to act as mobile phone, there are still some limitations, such as the usage of proprietary firmware for DSP (Digital Signal Processor), which is being managed by the OsmocomBB software, and lack of GPRS support. Moreover, these phones are not manufactured anymore, so it's not so easy to find them nowadays.

Taking the known problems and limitations into account, and having a strong desire to give everyone the new possibilities for research and education in the telecommunications scope, we decided to write a 'bridge' between OsmocomBB and SDR. Using GNU Radio, a well known environment for signal processing, we have managed to get some interesting results, which we would like to share with community on the upcoming CCC.

UPSat - the first open source satellite

During 2016 Libre Space Foundation a non-profit organization developing open source technologies for space, designed, built and delivered UPSat, the first open source software and hardware satellite.

UPSat is the first open source software and hardware satellite. The presentation will be covering the short history of Libre Space Foundation, our previous experience on upstream and midstream space projects, how we got involved in UPSat, the status of the project when we got involved, the design, construction, verification, testing and delivery processes. We will also be covering current status and operations, contribution opportunities and thoughts about next open source projects in space. During the presentation we will be focusing also on the challenges and struggles associated with open source and space industry.

Holography of Wi-Fi radiation

Can we see the stray radiation of wireless devices? And what would the world look like if we could?

When we think of wireless signals such as Wi-Fi or Bluetooth, we usually think of bits and bytes, packets of data and runtimes.

Interestingly, there is a second way to look at them. From a physicist's perspective, wireless radiation is just light, more precisely: coherent electromagnetic radiation. It is virtually the same as the beam of a laser, except that its wavelength is much longer (cm vs µm).

We have developed a way to visualize this radiation, providing a view of the world as it would look like if our eyes could see wireless radiation.

Our scheme is based on holography, a technique to record three-dimensional pictures by a phase-coherent recording of radiation in a two-dimensional plane. This technique is traditionally implemented using laser light. We have adapted it to work with wireless radiation, and recorded holograms of building interiors illuminated by the omnipresent stray field of wireless devices. In the resulting three-dimensional images we can see both emitters (appearing as bright spots) and absorbing objects (appearing as shadows in the beam). Our scheme does not require any knowledge of the data transmitted and works with arbitrary signals, including encrypted communication.

This result has several implications: it could provide a way to track wireless emitters in buildings, it could provide a new way for through-wall imaging of building infrastructure like water and power lines. As these applications are available even with encrypted communication, it opens up new questions about privacy.

Art Installation Eavesdrops on Hospital Pagers with a HackRF

HolyPager Art Installation. HackRF One, Antenna and Raspberry Pi seen under the shelf.
HolyPager Art Installation. HackRF One, Antenna and Raspberry Pi seen under the shelf.

For a long time now it has been known that pager data is sent in the clear and in plain text over a strong and easily received RF signal. The signal can easily be intercepted with a standard scanner radio or more recently with an SDR such as the RTL-SDR. Software such as PDW can then be used to decode the signal into plain text. We have a tutorial on this available here.

In these more modern days of cell phones and secure text messaging very few people still use pagers. But one heavy user of pagers is the medical community who still prefer them as they are already widely implemented in hospitals and are very reliable. The lower frequencies and high transmission powers used by pager systems allows for better reception especially in areas prone to poor cellphone reception such as in big buildings like hospitals with many walls underground areas. They are also very reliable as they receive messages instantly, whereas text messages can be delayed in times of high network traffic which is obviously a problem when a doctor is needed urgently. Finally, another advantage is that most pagers only receive, so there are no local transmissions that could interfere with sensitive medical machines. A major downside however is that pager use means that a lot of very private patient data can be easily intercepted by anyone anywhere in the same city as the hospital.

Back in October artist and programmer Brannon Dorsey displayed an art installation at the Radical Networks conference in Brooklyn which he calls Holypager. The idea is to bring attention to the breach of privacy. The installation simply prints out the pager messages as they are sent in real time, accumulating patient data that any visitor can pick up and read. He doesn't mention it on his page, but in one of the photos we see a HackRF One, antenna and Raspberry Pi hiding underneath the installation which is how the pager messages are received. A simple RTL-SDR could also be used as the receiver. Brannon writes:

Holypager is an art installation that intercepts all POCSAG pager messages in the city it resides and forwards them to one (holy) pager. The installation anonymizes all messages and forwards them randomly to one of three pagers on display. Each message is also printed on a contiguous role of receipt paper amassing a large pile of captured pages for gallery goers to peruse.

Pagers use an outdated protocol that requires all messages to be broadcast unencrypted to each pager in the area. It is the role of the individual pager to filter and display only the messages intended for its specific address. The pagers below have been reprogrammed to ignore this filter and receive every message in the city in real time. Today, these devices are primarily used in hospitals to communicate highly sensitive information between doctors and hospital staff.

Given the severity of the HIPPA Privacy Act, one would assume that appropriate measures would be taken to prevent this information from being publicly accessible to the general public. This project serves as a reminder that as the complexity and proliferation of digital systems increase the cultural and technological literacy needed to understand the safe and appropriate use of these systems often do not.

[Also seen on Hackaday and Motherboard]

Exploring Vulnerabilities in Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems (TPMS) with a HackRF

Over on YouTube the channel "Lead Cyber Solutions" has uploaded a video presentation for the Cyber Skills Competition. In the video Christopher Flatley, James Pak and Thomas Vaccaro discuss a man-in-the-middle attack that can be performed on vehicle Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems (TPMS) with a transmit capable SDR such as a HackRF.

A TPMS system consists of small battery powered wireless sensors placed on a vehicles wheels which automatically monitor tire pressure. An LCD basestation usually exists on the dashboard of the car indicating live tire pressure. Most modern cars come with this feature, and it is simple to retrofit an older car with an aftermarket TPMS system.

The idea behind the vulnerability is that a HackRF can be used to reverse engineer the TMPS signal, and then re-transmit a new fake signal that causes the base station to read the tire pressure as low. This can set off an alarm in the car and possibly cause someone to pull over. More alarmingly, they discuss how tractors have automatic tire inflation systems which work using similar sensors. A false low pressure reading could cause the tractor tires to over inflate and be damaged.

In the past we have also posted about Jared Boon's work on TPMS where he shows how privacy could be breached by monitoring and tracking TPMS identifiers.

TempestSDR: An SDR tool for Eavesdropping on Computer Screens via Unintentionally Radiated RF

Thanks to RTL-SDR.com reader 'flatflyfish' for submitting information on how to get Martin Marinov's TempestSDR up and running on a Windows system. If you didn't already know by definition "TEMPEST" refers to techniques used by some spy agencies to eavesdrop on electronic equipment via their unintentional radio emissions (as well as via sounds and vibrations). All electronics emit some sort of unintentional RF signals, and by capturing and processing those signals some data can be recovered. For example the unintentional signals from a computer screen could be captured, and converted back into a live image of what the screen is displaying.

TempestSDR is an open source tool that allows you to use any SDR that has a supporting ExtIO (such as RTL-SDR, Airspy, SDRplay, HackRF) to receive the unintentional signal radiation from a screen, and turn that signal back into a live image. This can let you view what is on a screen without any physical connections. If a high gain directional antenna is used then it may be possible to receive images from several meters away as well.

TempestSDR showing what's on the screen via unintentional RF radiation from the monitor.
TempestSDR showing what's on the screen via unintentional RF radiation from the monitor.

Although TempestSDR has been released now for a number of years it hasn't worked properly in Windows with ExtIO interfaces. In his email flatflyfish showed us how to compile a new version that does work.

1. You need to install a 32-bit version of the Java runtime. The 64-bit version won't work with extio's possibly because they are all 32-bit. Also install the JDK.

2. You need to install MingW32 and MSYS and put their bin folders in your Windows PATH.

3. Then when compiling I was seeing a lot of CC command unknown errors. To fix that I just added CC=gcc to the top of all makefiles. I also removed the Mirics compilation line from the JavaGUI makefile to make things easier as we're not using that sdr.

4. Originally my JDK folder was in Program Files. The makefile didn't like the spaces in the folder, so I moved it to a folder without spaces and it fixed the errors.

5. Lastly to compile it you need to specify the ARCHNAME as x86 eg "make all JAVA_HOME=F:/Java/jdk1.7.0_45 ARCHNAME=X86"

After doing all that it compiled and I had a working JAR file. The extio's that are used normally with HDSDR work fine now and I get some images from my test monitor with an rtlsdr.

We tested compilation ourselves and were successful at getting a working program. To help others we've just uploaded a fork of the code with the makefile changes done, as well as a precompiled release ZIP available on the releases page so no compilation should be required to just use it. Note that to use the precompiled JAR you still need to install MingW32, and also don't forget to install the MingW /bin and msys /1.0/bin folders into the Windows PATH. You also do need to have the 32-bit Java runtime installed as the 64-bit version doesn't seem to work. On at least one Win 10 machine we also had to manually add a 'Prefs' folder to the Java path in the registry.

We've tested the software with the ExtIO for RTL-SDRs (available on the HDSDR downloads page) and confirmed that it works. Images from one of our older DELL monitors using DVI are received nicely, although they are a bit blurry. We also tried using an Airspy or SDRplay unit and this significantly improved the quality of the images a lot due to the larger bandwidth. The quality was good enough to make out large text on the screens. ExtIO's for the Airspy are available on this page, and for the SDRplay on the official SDRplay website. Note that for the SDRplay we were unable to go above 6 MHz, and on the RTL-SDR 2.8 MHz was the limit - anything higher on these SDRs did not produce an image possibly due to dropped samples.

To use the software you should ideally know the resolution and refresh rate of your target monitor. But if you don't there are auto-correlation graphs which actually help to predict the detected resolution and frame rate. Just click on the peaks. Also, you will need to know the frequency that your monitor unintentionally emits at. If you don't know you can browse around in SDR# looking for interference peaks that change depending on what the image of the screen is showing. For example in the image below we show what the interference might look like. A tip to improving images is to increase the "Lpass" option and to watch that the auto FPS search doesn't deviate too far from your expected frame rate. If it goes too far, reset it by re-selecting your screen resolution.

Unintentionally radiated RF signal from computer screen shown in SDR#
Unintentionally radiated RF signal from computer screen shown in SDR#

The best results were had with the Airspy listening to an older 19" DELL monitor connected via DVI. A newer Phillips 1080p monitor connected via HDMI had much weaker unintentional signals but images were still able to be recovered. A third AOC 1080p monitor produced no emissions that we could find.

Clear images were obtained with an antenna used in the same room as the monitor. In a neighboring room the images on the DELL monitor could still be received, but they were too blurry to make anything out. Possibly a higher gain directional antenna could improve that.

An example set up with RTL-SDR antenna and monitors
An example set up with RTL-SDR antenna and monitors

Below we've uploaded a video to YouTube showing our results with TempestSDR.

If you want to learn more about TEMPEST and TempestSDR Martin Marinovs dissertation on this software might be a good read (pdf).