Tagged: eavesdropping

Using the Don’t Look Up Tool to Eavesdrop on Insecure Private Satellite Communications

Over on YouTube, Rob VK8FOES has uploaded a video showing how to install and use the "dontlookup" open-source Linux Python research tool for evaluating satellite IP link security. Back in October, we posted about a new Wired article that discussed how many geostationary satellites are broadcasting sensitive, unencrypted data in the clear and how a cheap DVB-S2 receiver and satellite dish can be used to eavesdrop on them.

In the video, Rob discusses the new dontlookup tool, which is an excellent one-stop shop open-source tool for parsing IP data from these satellites. He goes on to show the full steps on how to install and use the tool in Linux. The end result is private internet satellite data being visible in Wireshark (blurred in the video for legal reasons). In the video description, Rob writes:

I thought I would make a video showcasing this new open-source Python tool for Linux. 'Don't look up' is the result of a research campaign conducted by a group of cyber security researchers from the USA for decoding DVB-S2 satellite data transponders.

Geostationary communications satellites are somewhat of a 'perfect target' to malicious threat actors, due to their downlink signals covering large portions of earth surface. This gives attackers are large attack surface to intercept IP traffic being transmitted from space. To most peoples surprise, little-to-no security, such as encryption, are being used on these data transponders!

This is all old news to myself, and the fans of my YouTube channel that have been following my TV-satellite hobby for the past couple of years. Most of this was already possible with consumer-grade satellite equipment and a Python application called GSExtract. However, the scope of GSExtract was a lot more narrower than that of DontLookUp, with the developers claiming to have achieved an exponential packet recovery rate compared to GSExtract.

Join me in this video today where I will be showing my users how to patch and build the TBS5927 USB satellite receiver drivers for RAW data capturing. I'll also be showcasing the software application called 'DVBV5-Zap' which interfaces with our satellite receiver to capture RAW data from a satellite. And finally, I will finish-off the video by demonstrating the actual usage of DontLookUp itself. To make the tutorial as accessible as possible, I'm doing the entire process inside a Linux virtual machine!

This tutorial will probably only work in DragonOS FocalX R37 Linux by the wonderful @cemaxecuter. You are welcome to try on other Linux distributions, but your mileage will vary! Also, due to the TBS5927 using something called a 'Isochronous Endpoint', it's only possible to use this satellite receiver via USB Passthrough in VMWare versions 17.5 and above. VirtualBox does not support Isochronous USB Endpoints in any version. It's always best to run Linux on 'bare-metal' by installing it directly to your PC's internal SSD, or running it from a bootable USB thumb drive.

Please understand that if you own an internal PCI-E satellite receiver card from TBS, it is not possible to 'pass it through' to Linux running inside in a Type-2 Hypervisor (VMware, VirtualBox etc.) Installing Linux on bare-metal is the only hope for PCI-E card owners. Thanks very much for watching!

HARDWARE:
TBS5927 USB Satellite Receiver
90cm 'Foxtel' Satellite Dish
Golden Media GM202+ LNB
Hills RG-6 Coaxial Cable (F-Type Connectors, 75 Ohm)

SOFTWARE:
VMWare Workstation 17.6.2
DragonOS FocalX R37 Linux
TBS 'Linux_Media' Drivers
'RAW Data Handling' Patch
DVBV5-Zap
DontLookUp

If you're interested in this topic, Rob's YouTube channel has many videos on this topic that are worth checking out.

Don't Look Up (No, Not The Movie): A New Research Tool To Evaluate Satellite IP Link Security!

Eavesdropping on Sensitive Data via Unencrypted Geostationary Satellites

Recently, Wired.com released an article based on research by researchers at UC San Diego and the University of Maryland, highlighting how much sensitive unencrypted data many geostationary satellites are broadcasting in the clear.

The researchers used a simple off-the-shelf 100cm Ku-band satellite dish and a TBS-5927 DVB-S/S2 USB Tuner Card as the core hardware, noting that the total hardware cost was about $800. 

Simple COTS hardware used to snoop on unencrypted satellite communications.
Simple COTS hardware used to snoop on unencrypted satellite communications.

After receiving data from various satellites, they found that a lot of the data being sent was unencrypted, and they were able to obtain sensitive data such as plaintext SMS and voice call contents from T-Mobile cellular backhaul and user internet traffic. The researchers notified T-Mobile about the vulnerability, and to their credit, turned on encryption quickly.

They were similarly able to observe uncrypted data from various other companies and organizations, too, including the US Military, the Mexican Government and Military, Walmart-Mexico, a Mexican financial institution, a Mexican bank, a Mexican electricity utility, other utilities, maritime vessels, and offshore oil and gas platforms. They were also able to snoop on users' in-flight WiFi data.

Cellular Backhaul
We observed unencrypted cellular backhaul data sent from the core network of multiple telecom providers and destined for specific cell towers in remote areas. This traffic included unencrypted calls, SMS, end user Internet traffic, hardware IDs (e.g. IMSI), and cellular communication encryption keys.

Military and Government
We observed unencrypted VoIP and internet traffic and encrypted internal communications from ships, unencrypted traffic for military systems with detailed tracking data for coastal vessel surveillance, and operations of a police force.

In‑flight Wi‑Fi
We observed unprotected passenger Internet traffic destined for in-flight Wi-Fi users on airplanes. Visible traffic included passenger web browsing (DNS lookups and HTTPS traffic), encrypted pilot flight‑information systems, and in‑flight entertainment.

VoIP
Multiple VoIP providers were using unencrypted satellite backhaul, exposing unencrypted call audio and metadata from end users.

Internal Commercial Networks
Retail, financial, and banking companies all used unencrypted satellite communications for their internal networks. We observed unencrypted login credentials, corporate emails, inventory records, and ATM networking information.

Critical Infrastructure
Power utility companies and oil and gas pipelines used GEO satellite links to support remotely operated SCADA infrastructure and power grid repair tickets.

The technical paper goes in depth into how they set up their hardware, what services and organizations they were able to eavesdrop on, and how they decoded the signals. The team notes that they have notified affected parties, and most have now implemented encryption. However, it seems that several services are still broadcasting in the clear.