At this year’s hacker themed Eleventh Hope conference, Stefan “Sec” Zehl and Schneider gave a talk which discusses their latest work on decoding data from Iridium satellites using SDR’s. Iridium is a truly global satellite service which provides various services such as global paging, satellite phones, tracking and fleet management services, as well as services for emergency, aircraft, maritime and covert operations too. There are currently 72 operational satellites operating.
In their talk they discuss how Iridium security is moderate to relaxed, pointing out that Iridium claims that the majority of ‘security’ comes from the complexity of the system, rather than actual security implementations. They then go on to discuss how the Iridium system works, how to receive it with an RTL-SDR or HackRF/Rad1o, how the gr-iridium decoder implementation works, and how to use it to actually decode the data. Later in the presentation they show some interesting examples such as an intercepted Iridium satellite phone call to a C-37 aircraft.
The attack works by first infecting a computer with their malware software. The malware then utilizes the USB data bus to create electromagnetic emissions on a connected USB device. In these tests they use a USB flash drive and write a file to the device in such a way that the emissions produced are transmitting decodable data. They write that any binary data can be modulated and transmitted to a nearby receiver, such as an RTL-SDR dongle. Data rates can reach up to 80 bytes/s. The data is modulated with binary frequency shift keying, and their receiver code is implemented in GNU Radio.
This story has also been featured on arstechnica and threatpost. The video below demonstrates the attack.
Earlier this week wired.com released a story indicating that researchers from the University of Birmingham have discovered two vulnerabilities that can be used to unlock almost any car. The first vulnerability concerns Volkswagen Group vehicles (VW, Audi, SEAT, Skoda) sold since 1995. Essentially their research found that the keyless entry systems of VW Group vehicles relies only on a few global master keys which they have been able to recover through reverse engineering of an undisclosed component used in a VW car. Then by sniffing the wireless key’s signal with an RF module or SDR like the RTL-SDR or HackRF they are able to recover the cryptographic algorithms used and then using the global key clone the wireless key signal, which can then be re-transmitted with a simple Arduino.
In their second research findings, the researcher’s write how they have been able to crack the Hitag2 rolling code system which is used in many vehicles such as Alfa Romeo, Chevrolet, Citroen, Dacia, Fiat, Ford, Lancia, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Opel, Peugot and Renault. Again, the hack works by sniffing a few wireless keyfob rolling code signals with an SDR or other device. Once the signals have been sniffed a simple laptop computer can reportedly break the encryption within one minute.
Here are some interesting excerpts from the conclusions of the paper:
The results of this paper show that major manufacturers have used insecure schemes over more than 20 years. Due to the widespread use of the analyzed systems, our findings have worldwide impact. Owners of affected vehicles should be aware that unlocking the doors of their car is much simpler than commonly assumed today. Both for the VW Group and the Hitag2 rolling code schemes, it is possible to clone the original remote control and gain unauthorized access to the vehicle after eavesdropping one or a few rolling codes, respectively. The necessary equipment to receive and send rolling codes, for example SDRs like the USRP or HackRF and off-the-shelf RF modules like the TI Chronos smart watch, are widely available at low cost.
A successful attack on the RKE and anti-theft system would also enable or facilitate other crimes:
– theft of the vehicle itself by circumventing the immobilizer system or by programming a new key into the car via the OBD port with a suitable tool
– compromising the board computer of a modern vehicle, which may even affect personal safety, e.g., by deactivating the brakes while switching on the wiping system in a bend
– inconspicuously placing an object or a person inside the car. The car could be locked again after the act
– on-the-road robbery, affecting the personal safety of the driver or passengers if they (incorrectly) assume that the vehicle is securely locked
Note that due to the long range of RKE systems it is technically feasible to eavesdrop the signals of all cars on a parking lot or at a car dealer by placing an eavesdropping device there overnight. Afterwards, all vulnerable cars could be opened by the adversary. Practical experiments suggest that the receiving ranges can be substantially increased: The authors of [18] report eavesdropping of a 433 MHz RFID system, with technology comparable to RKE, from up to 1 km using low-cost equipment.
The findings were presented at the Usenix Advanced Computing Systems Association conference during August 10-12, 2016 in Austin, TX. The white paper is titled “Lock It and Still Lose It—On the (In)Security of Automotive Remote Keyless Entry Systems” and can be downloaded here. Of course they did not publish the actual VW master keys in their paper and they have notified VW and NXP who make the Hitag2 chips in advance, noting that Hitag2 had actually been broken for several years prior.
Back in February we showed how Smay Kamkar was able to bypass rolling codes with his RollJam device, however the findings by these researcher’s is different in that they are actually able to generate new rolling codes, such that a simple Arduino with transmitter can act as a second wireless remote.
A $40 Arduino which can be used to record wireless rolling codes, then transmit new ones once the encryption has been broken.
Online magazine Motherboard have recently uploaded a video on YouTube where a reporter interviews white hat hacker Ang Cui. Cui is the inventor of the Funtenna which is software malware that can infect any embedded device, turning it into an improvised RF transmitter.
As an example of the type of devices the Funtenna can infect, Cui shows how he infected a desktop telephone, as well as a desktop printer. The malware running on the phone causes the phone to transmit an RF signal of the voices heard by the microphone, and the malware running on the printer causes the printer to emit a binary coded transmission of the text being printed. The malware is able to do this by forcing a GPIO, PWM or UART interface on the printer to modulate in a similar way to what is done with the Raspberry Pi FM transmitter project, rpitx. To receive and decode the signal Cui uses a software defined radio and a GNU Radio program.
Ang Cui previously presented his work on Blackhat 2015 and his slides can be found here, and we also show the video of his presentation below in the second video.
How Hackers Could Wirelessly Bug Your Office
Emanate Like A Boss: Generalized Covert Data Exfiltration With Funtenna
Over on YouTube user Crazy Danish Hacker has been working on uploading an entire series on GSM Sniffing with an RTL-SDR. His series is explained in a slow and clear presenting style, and it starts at the very beginning from installing the RTL-SDR. The tutorial series is not yet complete, however he is uploading a new video almost daily. Presumably the series will end with showing you how to receive text messages and voice calls originating from your own cellphone.
So far he has shown how to install the RTL-SDR, identify GSM downlinks, install and use GQRX and kalibrate, locate nearby cell towers, install and use GR-GSM and how to extract the TMSI & KC keys from your cell phone. To obtain the TMSI & KC keys he shows us how to use an Android tool called usbswitcher which forces the phone to use its USB modem interface, from which the keys can be obtained.
The video below shows his teaser video on the series. Check out his GSM playlist to view the full series.
GSM Sniffing Teaser - Software Defined Radio Series!
"Pokémon Go" is the latest in smartphone augmented reality gaming crazes. You may have already heard about the game on the news, or seen kids playing it in your neighborhood. To play, players must walk around in the real world with their GPS enabled smartphone, collecting different virtual Pokémon which appear at random spots in the real world, replenishing the virtual items need to collect Pokemon at "Pokéstops" and putting Pokémon to battle at "Gyms". Pokéstops and gyms are often city landmarks such as popular shops, fountains, statues, signs etc. For those who have no idea what "Pokémon" are: Pokémon are fictional animals from a popular children's cartoon and comic.
Since the game is GPS based, Stefan Kiese decided to see if he could cheat at the game by spoofing his GPS location using a HackRF software defined radio. The HackRF is a relatively low cost multipurpose TX and RX capable software defined radio. When playing the game, players often walk from Pokéstop to Pokéstop, collecting Pokémon along the way, and replenishing their items. By spoofing the GPS signal he is able to simulate walking around in the physical world, potentially automating the collection of Pokémon and replenishment of items at Pokéstops.
To do this he used the off the shelf "GPS-SDR-Sim" software by Takuji Ebinuma which is a GPS Spoofing tool for transmit capable SDR's like the HackRF, bladeRF and USRP radios. At first, when using the software Stefan noticed that the HackRF was simply jamming his GPS signals, and not simulating the satellites. He discovered the problem was with the HackRF's clock not being accurate enough. To solve this he used a function generator to input a stable 10 MHz square wave into the HackRF's clock input port. He also found that he needed to disable "Assisted GPS (a-gps)" on his phone which uses local cell phone towers to help improve GPS location tracking.
Next he was able to use the GPS-SDR-Sim tools to plot a simulated walking route and see his virtual character walking around on the real world map. A warning if you intend on doing this: Remember that 1) spoofing or jamming GPS is highly illegal in most countries outside of a shielded test lab setting, so you must ensure that your spoofed GPS signal does not interfere with anything, and 2) the game likely has cheating detection and will probably ban you if you don't simulate a regular walking speed.
ANT-FS is a wireless file transfer protocol that is designed specifically for transferring files wireless between two devices. It is designed for ultra low power devices and typically runs on devices operated by a coin sized battery. It is commonly used in applications like fitness tracker devices, which store data to later be downloaded to a PC.
Over on YouTube user sghctoma has uploaded a video showing a teaser of him receiving and decoding ANT-FS packets with blocks developed for the POTHOS graphical language. As ANT-FS is usually transmitted at 2.4 GHz, he had to use a MMDS downconverter which allowed his RTL-SDR to receive the packets. Sghctoma writes that the video is simply a teaser, and that a live demo with real deivce, and the full code + details will be released during his talk at DEFCON titled “Help, I’ve got ANTs!!!”.
ANT-FS sniffing with RTL-SDR, an MMDS downconverter and Pothosware
To reverse engineer the drones wireless communications system the teams used software defined radios like the HackRF and BladeRF, and also an alternative method involving just using an Arduino and nRF24L01+ receiver chip. Once the signal was received, they used GNU Radio to decode the signal into packets of data. After analyzing the data they found that the data bytes were easily reverse engineered and then were able to transmit their own data packets to control the drone. The post goes into further detail on the specifics of the reverse engineering.
The Syma X8C drone to be stolen in the competition.
