Category: HackRF

Using a Drone and HackRF to Inject URLs, Phish For Passwords on Internet Connected TVs by Hijacking Over the Air Transmissions

There is nothing wrong with your television set. Do not attempt to adjust the picture. We are controlling transmission.

At this years Defcon conference security researcher Pedro Cabrera held a talk titled  "SDR Against Smart TVs; URL and channel injection attacks" that showed how easy it is to take over a modern internet connected smart TV with a transmit capable SDR and drone. The concept he demonstrated is conceptually simple - just broadcast a more powerful signal so that the TV will begin receiving the fake signal instead. However, instead of transmitting with extremely high power, he makes use of a drone that brings a HackRF SDR right in front of the targets TV antenna. The HackRF is a low cost $100-$300 software defined radio that can transmit.

Title Slide from the Defcon 27 Talk: SDR Against Smart TVs; URL and channel injection attacks.
Title Slide from the Defcon 27 Talk: SDR Against Smart TVs; URL and channel injection attacks.

While the hijacking of TV broadcasts is not a new idea, Pedro's talk highlights the fact that smart TVs now expose significantly more security risks to this type of attack. In most of Europe, Australia, New Zealand and some places in Western Asia and the Middle East they use smart TV's with the HbbTV standard. This allows for features like enhanced teletext, catch-up services, video-on-demand, EPG, interactive advertising, personalisation, voting, games, social networking, and other multimedia applications to be downloaded or activated on your TV over the air via the DVB-T signal.

The HbbTV standard carries no authentication. By controlling the transmission, it's possible to display fake phishing messages that ask for passwords and transmit the information back over the internet. A hacker could also inject key loggers and install cryptominers.

Recorded talks from the Defcon conference are not up on YouTube yet, but Wired recently ran a full story on Pedros talk, and it's worth checking out here. The slides from his presentation can be found on the Defcon server, and below are two videos that show the attack in action, one showing the ability to phish out a password. His YouTube channel shows off several other hijacking videos too.

SDR Against Smart TVs: Drones carrying SDRs

SDR Against Smart TVs: Social engineering

 

SDRTrunk 0.4.0 Alpha 9 Updates Highlighted

You may recall that a few years ago we released a tutorial on how to set up and use [SDRTrunk]. Fast forward a few years and the software has seen numerous changes. This application was designed primarily for tracking trunking radio systems but also has the ability to decode things like MDC-1200, LoJack and more.

The software is compatible with many Software Defined Radios such as our RTL-SDR v3, HackRF and the Airspy. Some of the newer improvements include a bundled copy of java so that an installation of java is not required on the host computer, as well as decoding improvements for P25 among other digital voice modes. You can find a full list of improvements along with the latest release on [GitHub]

The biggest feature many have been waiting for is the ability to import talk groups for their radio system into the application from radio reference. While this has not yet been implemented, user [Twilliamson3] has created a [web application] that will convert table data from radio reference into a format that is supported by SDRTrunk.

SDRTrunk Screenshot
SDRTrunk Screenshot

Running a Tesla Model 3 on Autopilot off the Road with GPS Spoofing

Regulus is a company that deals with sensor security issues. In one of their latest experiments they've performed GPS spoofing with several SDRs to show how easy it is to divert a Tesla Model 3 driving on autopilot away from it's intended path. Autopilot is Tesla's semi-autonomous driving feature, which allows the car to decide it's own turns and lane changes using information from the car's cameras, Google Maps and it's Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) sensors. Previously drivers had to confirm upcoming lane changes manually, but a recent update allows this confirmation to be waived.

The Regulus researchers noted that the Tesla is highly dependent on GNSS reliability, and thus were able to use an SDR to spoof GNSS signals causing the Model 3 to perform dangerous maneuvers like "extreme deceleration and acceleration, rapid lane changing suggestions, unnecessary signaling, multiple attempts to exit the highway at incorrect locations and extreme driving instability". Regarding exiting at the wrong location they write:

Although the car was a few miles away from the planned exit when the spoofing attack began, the car reacted as if the exit was just 500 feet away— slowing down from 60 MPH to 24 KPH, activating the right turn signal, and making a right turn off the main road into the emergency pit stop. During the sudden turn the driver was with his hands on his lap since he was not prepared for this turn to happen so fast and by the time he grabbed the wheel and regained manual control, it was too late to attempt to maneuver back to the highway safely.

In addition, they also tested spoofing on a Model S and found there to be a link between the car's navigation system and the automatically adjustable air suspension system. It appears that the Tesla adjusts it's suspension depending on the type of road it's on which is recorded in it's map database.

In their work they used a ADALM PLUTO SDR ($150) for their jamming tests, and a bladeRF SDR ($400) for their spoofing tests. Their photos also show a HackRF.

Regulus are also advertising that they are hosting a Webinar on July 11, 2019 at 09:00PM Jerusalen time. During the webinar they plan to talk about their Tesla 3 spoofing work and release previously unseen footage.

GPS/GNSS spoofing is not a new technique. In the past we've posted several times about it, including stories about using GPS spoofing to cheat at Pokémon Go, misdirect drivers using Google Maps for navigation, and even a story about how the Russian government uses GPS spoofing extensively.

Some SDR tools used to spoof the Tesla Model 3.
Some SDR tools used to spoof the Tesla Model 3.

Hak5: Hacking Ford Key Fobs with a HackRF and Portapack

This weeks episode of Hak5 (an information security themed YouTube channel) features Dale Wooden (@TB69RR) who joins hosts Shannon and Darren to demonstrate a zero day vulnerability against Ford keyless entry/ignition. More details about the vulnerability will be presented at this years DEF CON 27 conference, which is due to be held on August 8 - 11.

In the video Dale first demonstrates how he uses a HackRF with Portapack to capture and then replay the signal from a Ford vehicle's keyfob. The result is that the original keyfob no longer functions, locking the owner out from the car. After performing a second process with another keyfob, Dale is now able to fully replicate a keyfob, and unlock the car from his HackRF.

Dale explains that unlike the well known jam-and-replay methods, his requires no jamming, and instead uses a vulnerability to trick the car into resetting the rolling code counter back to zero, allowing him to capture rolling codes that are always valid. Dale also notes that he could use any RX capable SDR like an RTL-SDR to automatically capture signals from over 100m away.

The vulnerability has been disclosed to Ford, and the full details and code to do the attack will only be released at DEF CON 27, giving Ford enough time to fix the vulnerability. It is known to affect 2019 Ford F-150 Raptors, Mustangs and 2017 Ford Expeditions, but other models are also likely to be vulnerable.

The video is split into three parts. In part 1 Dale demonstrates the vulnerability on a real vehicle and in part 2 he explains the story behind his discovery, how he responsibly disclosed the vulnerability to Ford and how to reset the keyfob yourself. Finally in part 3 Darren interviews Dale about his experiences in the RF security field.

Dales discovery has also been written up in an article by The Parallex which explains the exploit in more detail.

Hacking Ford Key Fobs Pt. 1 - SDR Attacks with @TB69RR - Hak5 2523 [Cyber Security Education]

Hacking Ford Key Fobs Pt. 2 - SDR Attacks with @TB69RR - Hak5 2524 [Cyber Security Education]

Hacking Ford Key Fobs Pt. 3 - SDR Attacks with @TB69RR - Hak5 2525 [Cyber Security Education]

SignalsEverywhere: What SDR To Buy? Choose the Right one For You

Over on his YouTube channel SignalsEverywhere, Corrosive has just released a new video titled "Software Defined Radio Introduction | What SDR To Buy? | Choose the Right one For You". The video is an introduction to low cost software defined radios and could be useful if you're wondering which SDR you should purchase.

The video includes a brief overview of the Airspy, KerberosSDR, PlutoSDR, LimeSDR Mini, HackRF, SDRplay RSPduo and various RTL-SDR dongles. In addition to the hardware itself Corrosive also discusses the compatible software available for each SDR.

Software Defined Radio Introduction | What SDR To Buy? | Choose the Right one For You

Using a HackRF to Reverse Engineer and Control Restaurant Pagers

Several years ago back in 2013 and 2014 we uploaded two posts showing how it was possible to use an SDR to listen in to restaurant pagers and collect data from them, and also to spoof their signal and activate them on demand. If you were unaware, restaurant pagers (aka burger pagers), are small RF controlled discs that some restaurants hand out to customers who are waiting for food. When the food is ready, the pager is remotely activated by the staff, and then flashes and buzzes, letting the customer know that their order can be picked up.

Over on YouTube user Tony Tiger has uploaded a video that shows an overview on how to reverse engineer the signal coming from a particular brand of restaurant pagers. The tools he uses include a HackRF SDR and the Inspectrum and Universal Radio Hacker software packages. If you're interested in reverse engineering signals, this is a good overview. Later in the video he shows a GNU Radio and Python program that he's created to control the pagers.

Hacking Restaurant Pagers with HackRF

SigintOS: A Linux Distro for Signal Intelligence

Recently we've heard of a new Linux distribution called SigintOS becoming available for download. SigintOS is an Ubuntu based distribution with a number of built in signal intelligence applications for software defined radios such as RTL-SDRs and other TX capable SDRs like the HackRF, bladeRF and USRP radios.

The distro appears to be very well executed, with a built in GUI that grants easy access to the some common sigint tools like an FM and GPS transmitter, a jammer, a GSM base station search tool and an IMSI catcher. SigintOS also has various other preinstalled programs such as GNU Radio, gr-gsm, YatesBTS, wireshark and GQRX.

The OS also teases an LTE search and LTE decoder which to access requires that you get in contact with the creators, presumably for a licencing fee. Regarding an LTE IMSI catcher they write:

LTE IMSI Catcher is not myth!

Due to the nature of LTE base stations, the capture of IMSI numbers seems impossible. LTE stations use GUTI to communicate with users instead of IMSI. The GUTI contains the temporary IMSI number called T-IMSI. This allows the operator to find out who is at the corresponding LTE station who is authorized to query T-IMSI information.

Can the GUTI number be found?
Answer Yes!

How to find GUTI and T-IMSI numbers?
Can be found with the help of SigintOS …

For detailed information [email protected]

The image comes as a 2GB ISO file, and it's possible to run it in WMWare or VirtualBox.

SIGINTOS IMSI Catcher
SigintOS IMSI Catcher

YouTube Tutorial: Eavesdropping on DECT6.0 Cordless Phones with a HackRF and GR-DECT2

Back in December of last year Corrosive from his YouTube channel SignalsEverywhere showed us a demo video of him receiving unecrypted DECT digital cordless phones with his HackRF.

DECT is an acronym for 'Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications', and is the wireless standard used by modern digital cordless phones as well as some digital baby monitors. In most countries DECT communications take place at 1880 - 1900 MHz, and in the USA at 1920 - 1930 MHz. Some modern cordless phones now use encryption on their DECT signal, but many older models do not, and most baby monitors do not either. However, DECT encryption is known to be weak, and can be broken with some effort.

In his latest video Corrosive shows us how to install GR-DECT2 on Linux, which is the GNU Radio based decoding software required to decode the DECT signal. He then goes on to show how the software can be used and finally provides some optimizations tips.

DECT 6.0 Cordless Phone Eavesdropping {Install GR-DECT2 and Decode with HackRF SDR} or E4000 RTL SDR